Our timed Z-channel a general case of the Zchannel appears as the basis for a large class of covert channels. Golomb analyzed the Z-channel, a memoryless channel with two input symbols and two output symbols, where one of the input symbols is transmitted with noise while the other is transmitted without noise, and the output symbol transmission times are e qual. We introduce the timed Z-channel, where the output symbol transmission times are di erent. Speci cally, we show how the timed Z-channel applies to two examples of covert timing channel scenarios: a CPU scheduler, and a token ring network. We then give a detailed analysis of our timed Z-channel. We report a new result expressing the capacity of the timed Z-channel as the log of the root of a trinomial equation. This changes the capacity calculation from an optimization problem into a simpler algebraic problem and illustrates the relationship between the noise and time factors. Further, it generalizes Shannon's work on noiseless channels for this special case. We also report a new result bounding the timed Z-channel's capacity from below. Finally, we show how an interesting observation that Golomb reported for the Z-channel also holds for the timed Zchannel.
Introduction
Covert timing channels arise from resource sharing in MLS systems. High can pass information to Low, by either interfering with, or refraining from interfering with, the timing of Low's activities. In most of these systems this interference is noisy. The simplest model for such i n terference, where the output alphabet consists of time values, is what we call the timed Zf moskowitz,greenwald,mkangg@itd.nrl.navy.mil channel. Knowledge of the characteristics of the timed Z-channel should allow the system designer to engineer countermeasures to this danger.
We discuss in detail two scenarios where the timed Z-channel may occur as a serious threat. Our rst scenario is a generalization of the well-known CPU scheduling channel 17, 25 , as discussed in a mathematical sense by Huskamp 9 , section 4 . It is very important to understand noisy versions of this scenario because many researchers are currently investigating countermeasures to this scenario and its variants e.g., 8, 7 , 3 0 , 1 0 . Note that McCullough's 20 half-bit channels" may be analyzed as timed Z-channels.
Our second scenario is quite di erent, dealing with a theoretical MLS computer network organized as a token ring topology. W e show h o w a timed Z-channel can be exploited as a covert channel in a speci c conguration of this network. Considering the current popularity of ring topologies for networks e.g., FDDI, FDDI-II, etc., we feel that understanding the behavior of any potential threat to MLS implementations of this type of network is desirable. We demonstrate that a c o v ert timed Z-channel threat exists under certain circumstances. Given the existence of such a threat, we feel that the designers of MLS token ring networks should be aware of the issues and mathematical tools needed to recognize this network threat.
Some of the important questions being investigated that relate to this paper follow.
Is capacity large enough to be of concern? Can understanding the mathematicalinterplay b et w een the noise and time variables in this covert channel be used to lessen capacity? How w ould the intentional introduction of noise a ect both capacity and system performance? Because of the above, we feel that an analysis of the capacity of the timed Z-channel is of great importance. 
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The known capacity results on the Z-channel do not extend to the timed Z-channel. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 the main mathematical results of this paper show h o w capacity can be easily expressed as the log of a zero of a trinomial. This lets us transform a complicated optimization problem into an algebraic problem. In turn, this gives us a simple method for calculating capacity and seeing the interplay b e t w een the noise and timing factors. Knowledge of the interplay between these various terms can lead us to a better understanding of how to lessen capacity without degrading performance. This has been seen in papers such a s 3, 4 , where noise is introduced in the system to lessen capacity. The best defense to covert channel threats is a thorough understanding and analysis of covert channel behavior. Knowledge of similar system behavior was of great signi cance during the design and implementation of the NRL Pump 12, 13, 14, 23 .
We n o w present our two scenarios in detail, give some background on the Z-channel, and then give a detailed exposition and analysis of our timed Z-channel.
Covert Channel Scenarios
There are two scenarios presented here. The rst is very well-known in the eld of covert channel analysis. The second is a previously undiscovered covert timing channel existing in an interesting three level environment to date, most discussions of covert channel attacks deal with only two levels.
Scenario 1 -The CPU scheduler type channel
The following type of con guration is common in computer systems. Assume that there are two levels L1 and L2, where L2 L1. There are two queues i.e., Q2 and Q1, where L2 processes put their jobs messages into Q2 and L1 processes put their jobs messages into Q1. A server, which is a shared resource, provides service in a round-robin fashion. A server may be a CPU which processes jobs from two di erent levels. This is illustrated in gure 1.
In such a scenario there exists a well-known covert timing channel from L2 to L1 17, 2 5 , 9 . We also note that studies of this type of covert channel have been useful in other areas, such as the analysis of the generalized version of the NRL Pump 15 . For simplicity, let us assume that each job takes time . Assume that an L1 process e.g., BL1 submits jobs and observes the time to complete each job. If an L2 process e.g., BL2 does not submit any job, each job in Q1 takes time to complete. If BL2 submits a job, BL1 observes time 2 to complete one of its jobs i.e., time for the BL2 job and an additional time for the BL1 job. Therefore, we h a v e the noiseless timing channel illustrated in gure 2. The capacity, in bits per time unit, of this noiseless channel is known to be ,1 log 1+ p 5 2 , 26, 2 1 . BL2 may decide to communicate with BL1 even in the presence of noise. The noise can be introduced by another L2 process e.g., GL2 that does not have a n y i n tention of communicating with BL1. If GL2 submits a job and BL2 does not submit a job i.e., BL2 attempts to send a binary 0, BL1 still observes time 2 which will be interpreted as a binary 1 from BL2. Therefore, we h a v e a c o v ert timed Z-channel where p +q = 1 as illustrated in gure 3. This type of channel, where capacity bits per time unit is not known, is the focus of this paper. 
Scenario 2 -A Token Ring Timing Channel
A token ring i s a t ype of computer network organized as a set of stations arranged in a ring topology, either physically, through serial connections of transmission media such a s t wisted pairs e.g., the IEEE 802.5 Token Ring Local Area Network standard 27 or ber optic links e.g., the Fiber Distributed Data Interface 5, 1 , 1 1 , or logically e.g., the IEEE 802. 4 Token Bus Local Area Network standard 29 . Information is sequentially transferred from station to station, circulating around the ring. Each station on the ring has a unique address, and each information packet transmitted on the ring contains among many other items a destination address, a source address, and a special bit used to detect when a packet has been received. If a station wishing to transmit data has access to the medium, it transfers an information packet onto the ring, where the packet circulates unidirectionally from one station to the next. Eventually, the destination station copies the information as it passes by o n the ring, and modi es the special bit to serve a s a n A CK to the source station. If all is working well, the packet eventually is received by the originating station and is removed from the ring.
A station gets the right to transmit a packet on the ring when it detects a special message called the token passing on the ring medium. The token is a symbol of authority passed between stations. It is used as a method for enforcing mutual exclusion among stations contending for the ring transmission medium only one station is allowed to control the ring at any given time. A station wishing to transmit a packet captures the token as it passes by, and holds it until it is nished with its transmission the time the token is held can vary, o r can be isochronous in the case of FDDI-II 28 . Generally, there is a maximum period of time that a station may hold the token and therefore control the network. Once a token holding station is nished with its transmissions, it releases the token to its downstream neighbor. General token ring management issues, such as initialization, error recovery, etc., are not dealt with in this paper, but are available in the references noted above. The reader who is not familiar with token ring networks may take it for granted that mechanisms exists for error recovery, ring initialization, adding and subtracting stations, and so forth.
A token holding station wishing to transmit information formats a packet containing among other things its source and the destination address, and transmits the packet to its downstream neighbor station. That station, via a hardware mechanism in the network interface, examines the destination address in the packet header, and if the packet is not destined for that station, it passes the packet on to the next station in the ring. If a station nds that a packet is destined for itself, it receives the packet, modi es the special bit in the packet signifying that it received the packet, and passes the packet on to its downstream neighbor station. Eventually, the packet will travel to the originating station i.e., the station holding the token. The originating station then examines the special bit to verify that the packet was received. It then passes releases the token on to the next station in the ring.
Of interest to us is an MLS token ring network. This is a token ring network where each station has a level. Communication between stations must obey the BellLaPadula BLP principles 2 . Such a token ring would allow only reception of packets by a station at a level that dominates the level of the transmitting station. Of course, the token is passed independently of any BLP considerations.
Such an MLS token ring network loosely based on the IEEE 802.4 and 802.5 standards would require hardware not needed for a non-MLS token ring network. A modi cation to the hardware would be needed so that all packets would have a label attached, indicating their Mandatory Access Control MAC level e.g., Low, Medium, High. In addition, we w ould want the hardware to enforce our MAC BLP-like policies, so that a packet sent from a station at a higher level could not be received by a station at a lower level i.e., in such a case, the packet would be sent unread to the downstream station. This could be easily accomplished by modifying if necessary the ring physical layer interface hardware of each station so that it fails to recognize any packets that have been transmitted by a station at a level higher than itself.
A c o v ert timing channel may exist in such an MLS token ring network when there are exactly three stations, S l ; S m ; and S h , and where each station has the respective levels of Low, Medium, and High see gure 4; PHY is our trusted physical layer interface. The actual physical location of the stations on the ring is unimportant.
Let us examine our hypothetical MLS Token Ring network with three stations, each with a unique MAC level. According to the BLP policy, there are only three allowable transmissions: S l to S m , S l to S h , and S m to S h . Suppose S m wishes to send information to S l in violation of the ring's MLS policy. F urther suppose that S m and S l are acting together to exploit the covert timing channel that follows. There are only two basic time intervals that are of interest, from the viewpoint of S m and S l : 3 t and 6t.
If no station wishes to transmit a message, then the token circulates completely around the ring in time 3t, where t is the time to transmit a message from one station to another we h a v e assumed for the sake o f simplicity in this explanation that each link transmission takes the same amount of time. Explicitly, if the token is initially held by S l , it takes time t to transmit the token to S l 's downstream neighbor station, it takes time t for S l 's downstream neighbor station to transmit the token to S l 's upstream neighbor station, and it takes time t to transmit the token from S l 's upstream neighbor station back t o S l . Therefore, the total time for this event i s 3 t . If any station say S l 's downstream neighbor wishes to transmit a message, then the time between S l initially passing the token, and then next receiving it is time 6t. In other words, if the token is initially held by S l , i t t a k es time t to transmit the token to S l 's downstream neighbor station suppose this station happens to be S m as shown in gure 4. S m then captures the token, and sends a message necessarily destined for S h in this case to its downstream neighbor station, S h , taking time t. S h then receives the message, modi es the special bit indicating that it received the message, and transmits the message to its downstream station S l , taking time t. S l 's ring interface hardware notices that the message is not destined for S l , so it passes the message back t o S m , again taking time t. S m is now nished with its transmission, so it passes the token to its downstream neighbor S h once more taking time t. S h has nothing to send to anyone due to the BLP policy so it transmits the token back t o S l in time t. Therefore, the total time for this event i s 6 t .
So we see that there are only two possible output symbol times that exist 3t and 6t. We believe the two output symbol times can be exploited by a c o v ert timing channel which w e n o w describe.
Suppose that S m wishes to send information to S l in violation of the BLP policy, and that S m and S l are cooperating i.e., they are using the following protocol.
S l remains completely passive, noting only when it has the token and how m uch time has elapsed since it last held the token i.e., when S l transmits the token, it starts a timer used to note how m uch time has elapsed until it next receives the token. These times will be either 3t i.e., no transmissions have occurred, or 6t a transmission has occurred from S m to S h | the only BLP allowable transmission that S l does not initiate. If S m wishes to send S l a binary zero, then when it holds the token it transmits nothing i.e., it just passes the token on to its downstream neighbor and when S l next holds the token it will notice that only time 3t has passed, and will interpret this event as a binary zero. If S m wishes to send S l a binary one, then when it holds the token, it sends a message to S h e.g., a simple ping" would su ce and when S l next holds the token it will notice that time 6t has passed and will interpret this event as a binary one.
Noise we discount thermal noise because it is a very unlikely event in most modern ring networks, generally on the order of 10 ,9 for FDDI is present in this system as legitimate messages. This is because legitimate messages must be sent at some point, or there would be no reason for the network to exist. Of the 3 allowable communications, two of them are originated by S l which o b viously is aware of its own transmissions and can treat these events as a temporary suspension of covert channel operations S m would also be aware of this through either receiving a message from S l , o r b y inference. Only one valid transmission, from S m to S h could introduce noise into this system. However, the noise introduced takes exactly time 6t, the same time as the second symbol. Therefore, we are dealing with a timed Z-channel. The situation described is quite possible. In any MLS Token Ring network that has three or more stations, there will, at some point in the life of the network, exist a three station con guration this is due to the method for generating the network and adding new stations | the interested reader is referred to 29 and 27 . It is certainly possible that the three station con guration will not contain three di erent levels. However, unless this can be ruled out, a timed Z-channel threat must be taken seriously. In addition, since FDDI and FDDI-II are organized as token rings, and given the current popularity of them, we feel it likely that such a scenario may occur. This is especially so in the isochronous FDDI-II, which lends itself to real-time applications. Note that in 1977 Karger 16, Ch. 11 mentioned that covert channels could arise by modulating inter-packet transmission times in generic distributed systems.
Discussion about the Scenarios
Note that we h a v e restricted ourselves to the simplied case of only two output symbols in the presentation of the noisy timing channel scenarios. It has been shown for noiseless timing channels 24 that introducing extra symbols can greatly increase the capacity. The full problem requires further research, since we did not nd it as tractable for noisy timing channels.
Also, note that we are using time values t 1 and 2t 1 , when we could have used t 1 and t 1 + where need not equal t 1 . The capacity analysis we do in this paper is the more general case where the two time values are not necessarily multiples of one another.
Before we can perform an analysis of channels with more than two output symbols, we m ust rst understand the simpler case of the timed Z-channel. We hope for a more complete analysis in the future. In 6 Golomb succinctly analyzed the mutual information and channel capacity of the Z-channel see gure 5. The Z-channel 1 is a discrete memoryless channel with two input symbols. One symbol, x 2 , is transmitted without noise and received as y 2 , while the other input symbolx 1 is transmitted with noise and received as either y 1 or y 2 . W e let u represent the probability P x 1 that x 1 is the input. Therefore, P x 2 = 1 , u .
The amount of noise constant with each transmission is given by the following channel matrix q = 1 , p , which describes the conditional probabilities.
P y 1 j x 1 P y 2 j x 1 P y 1 j x 2 P y 2 j x 2 = p q 0 1 1 We use a channel where the second symbol is transmitted noiselessly. The standard descriptions of the Z-channel have the rst symbol transmitted noiselessly. There is no di erence other than pictorially. H o w ever, our re ected picture helps with the physical intuition of the timed Z-channel introduced later.
Let us now calculate the mutual information I in units of bits per symbol. I is the di erence in entropies HY ,HY j X. The output entropy HY = H y 1 ; y 2 , where we are using the shorthand notation 2 of Ha; b = ,fa loga + b logbg. W e condition by P y j = P y j j x 1 P x 1 + P y j j x 2 P x 2 to facilitate our calculations. Thus, P y 1 In brief, a timed Z-channel is identical to Golomb's Z-channel except that the output symbol y 2 has a greater transmission time than y 1 .
Implicit in our discussions of Golomb's Z-channel is that the symbols take the same amount of time to be transmitted. The time that the symbols take t o transmit is not an issue. Therefore, units are in bits per symbol when we are dealing with the Z-channel. To a v oid confusion, I I t will be mutual information in bits per symbol tick, the time unit, and C C t will be capacity in bits per symbol tick. In general, for discrete memoryless channels, if all symbols take the same time to be transmitted, we h a v e I t = , 1 I and C t = ,1 C. H o w ever, for the timed Z-channel, transmission times of the two symbols are di erent, so C t is not a multiple of C. In the next section we analyze the timed Z-channel. the notation Z -channel", where is the di erence in time t 2 , t 1 0, for the timed Z-channel see gure 6 . Of course, the channel matrix of the Z -channel is identical to that of the Z-channel. Therefore, I for the Z -channel is the same as I for the Z-channel. Note that the Z-channel is just a Z0-channel. Let T represent the Bernoulli random variable that describes the time that an output symbol arrives. The probability P T = t j , or written more simply as P t j , is the probability P y j . Hence, the expected value mean of T is ET = t 1 up + t 2 1 , up. Since = t 2 , t 1 we h a v e E T = t 1 + 1 , up :
We see that if the channel is noiseless that ET j q=0 = We wish to calculate the capacity in units of bits per tick, C t , for the Z -channel. Verd u 31 has shown that C t = max u I t , and that this is the proper measure of maximal asymptotically error-free information ow. We can nd C t by setting dIt du = 0 and solving for u. We denote the value of u that maximizes I t by u c . Since the term pq q=p is so important w e will include a plot of it see gure 7. Keep in mind that pq q=p is de ned by its limiting values of 0 and 1 at p = 0 and p = 1, respectively.
Of course, the variable in Eq. 1 is functionally dependent u p o n p , but Eq. 1 is very appealing because if p = 1, Eq. Z0- channel our result gives us C t j =0 = 1 t1 log1 + pq q=p , which can be easily obtained from Golomb's paper. This is an intriguing generalization of Shannon's result on capacity.
We also note that our results turn the capacity calculation from an optimization problem into a much simpler algebraic problem. The algorithm necessary to calculate the capacity is nothing more than a simple root nder.
Let us see what else we can glean from the above results. We will use the notation C t p for the capacity of the Z -channel with noise q = 1 , p for the noiseless case the capacity is then C t 1. We are interested in the behavior of C t p a s p v aries from 1 to 0 i.e., from noiseless to useless for t 1 and xed. By Theorem 1 we h a v e C t p = log r p = logr p + log . Since = , pq q=p 1=t1 we see that we have C t p = log r p + logpq q=p t1 . W e are adding a negative w e are not including the trivial comparison where p = 1 term to logr p . We will use this expression to bound C t p from below. Consider the equation 1 , ,t1+ + ,t1 = 0 : This is equivalent to the equation t1+ = ,t1+ + . Therefore, r p is the value of where the plot of t1+ intersects the plot of ,t1+ + , and r 1 is the value of where the plot of t1+ intersects the plot of 1+ see gure 8. Since ,t1+ 1 w e see that r p r 1 . Hence, log r 1 log r p log r 1 + log log r p + log C t 1 + log C t p :
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, P ages 2 11, Oakland, California, May 6 8, 1996 Therefore the capacity C t p is never less than C t 1+ log. Since C t p C t 1 we h a v e:
Theorem 2 For the Z -channel the capacity C t p is always bounded a s max0; C t 1 + log C t p C t 1 :
We m a y i n terpret this as a feasibility region where C t p m ust lie see gure 9. Note that if we used Corollary 1 instead of Theorem 1 w e w ould only obtain the known and obvious bound that C t p C t 1.
5. Comments on the very noisy Zchannel Majani 18 has done a systematic study of very noisy" channels in his dissertation. We are only concerned with examining the Z -channel as p ! 0 + which i s a v ery noisy channel. Golomb l o o k ed at the Z-channel under the same behavior and noted some interesting behavior. We will show that the Z -channel behaves similarly. This result is remarkable because it implies that even though x 1 is received more and more often as y 2 , w e still must send x 1 a large amount of the time to achieve capacity. F urther, Golomb showed that u c varies only from 1=2 t o 1 =e, a s p v aries from 1 to 0. This is of interest in light of a recent result of Majani and Rumsey they are concerned with units of bits per symbol, not time 18, 19 :
Theorem 4 Majani & Rumsey
For a binary-input discrete memoryless channel with C 0 , C is achieved when the the probability of the rst symbol being input is in the interval 1=e; 1,1=e.
Of course then the probability for the second symbol is also in the same interval. Therefore, Golomb's example when p ! 0 + represents the limiting case of Majani and Rumsey's result, and shows that Theorem 4 is the best possible bound for u c . Majani and Rumsey have noted that this does not hold, in general, for more than two input symbols. Note that the result does not hold for timing channels.
Counter-Example: Take the noiseless q = 0 Zchannel with t 1 = 1 and = 29, then u c :919 1 , 1=e . Therefore, Majani and Rumsey's result will not hold for timing channels.
Let us see if Golomb's result generalizes to the timed Z-channel by studying the Z -channel when it is very noisy, i.e., p ! 0 + . A s w e remarked above, Golomb showed for the Z-channel that u c ! 1=e. Therefore, we m ust study the root of Eq. 1 when p = 0. This is a little tricky because both and are functions of p. Recalling that ,t1 = up, s o , = up =t1 we m a y express Eq. 1 as: up pq q=p ,1 q , q=t1p p , =t1 u =t1 p =t1 + 1 = 1 : Which, by letting ==p simpli es to p u + 1 = =t1 u 1+ =t1 = : 3 By using L'Hôpital's rule we see that lim We nd this result to be of great mathematical interest. It is worth noting that even though Majani and Rumsey's result on u c values does not generalize to the timed Z-channel, Golomb's result on the boundary behavior of u c does. Theorem 5 might be of use in the design of a code to exploit a very noisy timed Z-channel.
We w onder what the correct generalization of Majani and Rumsey's results are for the timed Z-channel. Results such as these are quite useful in estimating capacity, when a closed form might be di cult to derive.
